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I. Introduction
The liner shipping industry is used to be a classic example of an oligopoly 
with a limited number of large shipping companies. A fragmented industry, 
populated by mid-sized, national flag carrying shipping lines, has largely 
disappeared as mega-carriers have emerged. Well-known names such as P&O, 
Nedlloyd, and Sea-Land have been sub named by market leader Maersk and 
other lines have followed in their track. 
Restructuring of the global shipping industry has been dominated by 
international alliances, mergers and acquisitions. M&A activities can be 
considered as one of foreign investment methods; establishing new plants 
and forming joint ventures, or undertaking an acquisition of a local firm.1) 
Advantages of M&A FDI arise from ready access to market share, technology, 
brand name and other firm-specific assets which immediately provide the 
It is equally valid to view M&A FDI as a cross-border variant of M&A which 
typically involves the acquisition of a firm in one country by a firm from 
another country.  
There is no doubt that liner shipping companies that merge horizontally 
or vertically influence their firm value. Most researches on the motivation 
of M&As are focused on the search for the synergy effect. These include 
rationalisation of operations and cost cutting particularly from bringing 
together administration, marketing and information technology. They also 
pursue economies of scale through the use of larger vessels, limit the number 
of ports of call for ships, seek high utilization of capacity and spread corporate 
fixed costs over greater output. Mergers and acquisitions or alliances can 
Another powerful motivation for M&As is to create shareholder value and 
improve corporate governance.2)
implies opportunities to improve performance and thus increase shareholder 
value by strengthening governance. The presence of such opportunities can be 
expected to attract not only domestic investors but also other foreign investors 
1) Alba, Park and Wang (2009), pp.1-11.
2) Brooks and Ritchie (2006), pp.7-22.
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for corporate control. Our research question is whether corporate governance 
strategies. We address ownership structure and power of corporate governance 
with respect to M&As and alliances decisions.
Top managers and shareholders play an important role in corporate 
governance. In a firm with separated ownership and control managers 
assume daily business activities. Agency theorists believe that both principals 
(shareholders) and agents (executives) prefer projects with higher returns to 
those of lower returns, but their interests diverge in terms of the uncertainty, 
or risk associated with different projects.3) 
Acquisitions result from CEOs’ hubris if they are overconfident in their 
personal capabilities to achieve synergy. The stock market appears to be 
one of the most effective mechanisms to prevent the abuse of managers’ 
discretion. The market for corporate control can be seen as the field where 
alternative management teams compete with each other for the right to 
manage corporate assets owned by the shareholders. 
 On the other hand, agency theory predicts that managers will act largely out 
strategies which increase self-interest of themselves unless they are closely 
monitored by large shareholders.4)
are likely to make more conglomerate mergers and exhibit higher levels of 
Ownership structures play a central role in determining the extent to which 
the interests of owners and managers are aligned.5) Ownership structure also 
less risky acquisitions but large shareholders and certain institutional owners 
pressing for higher risk acquisitions.6)
The paper is organized as follows. First, it provides background information 
on the industry, followed by an overview of corporate governance. The 
empirical study and the results are then presented. Section IV discusses the 
3) Lane, Cannella Jr. and Lubatkin (1998), pp.555-587.
4) Demsetz (1983), pp.375-395 ; Shleifer and Vishny (1986), pp.461-488 ; Walsh and Seward (1990), pp.421-458.
5) Dalton et al. (2003), pp.13-26.
6) Wright et al. (1996), pp.441-463 ; (2002), pp.41-53.
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II. Shipping industry and corporate governance
1. Shipping industry 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) represent a prevalent strategy in the liner 
shipping industry to reduce costs and improve profitability. The maritime 
transport industry is characterized by its concentration of market with the top 
2003. However, the industry is not known for stable return on investment. 
It is difficult to make continuing positive returns. That low returns offer 
limited shareholder growth, with that growth in shipping running two percent 
annually over the 1993-1997 period, compared with 30% for logistics 
services, 14% for equipment leasing, and 7% for truckload trucking.7) 
Mergers and acquisitions may not only have long-term strategic and 
economic effects, they may also impact directly and immediately on the value 
of the company.8) Horizontal mergers and alliances enhance service quality 
for shippers by increasing the geographical span of services. This is consistent 
with shippers’ interests in using fewer lines to serve global markets. Vertical 
mergers and alliances may enhance lines’ capability to provide well-integrated 
transport and logistics services. 
The liner shipping industry has undergone an unprecedented consolidation in 
nineties. The consolidation phenomenon was highlighted through a series of 
M&As in other industries, and about alliances in liner shipping industry, little 
has been understood about M&As in the total maritime sector of transport. 
Mergers and acquisitions took place to rationalize activities, reduce costs, 
and create significant economies of scale, all of which are conducive to 
establish a major market player. The formation of P&O Nedlloyd Container 
Line was a strategy aiming towards improving the performance of the 
container shipping activities of the two listed companies. The partners aimed 
at achieving cost reduction in the order of US$200 million annually offset 
against an initial re-structuring cost of USD100 million.9) 
7) Kadar, Compton and Randall (1999), pp.3-9.
8) Panayides and Gong (2002), pp.55-80.
9) Panayides and Gong (2002).
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The largest mergers occurred in 1997 with the integration of P&O 
Containers and Royal Nedlloyd Line (P&O Nedlloyd) followed by the merger 
of Neptune Orient Lines (NOL) and American President Lines (APL). The 
merger of SeaLand and Maersk (Maersk - SeaLand) was completed in 1999. 
firms were able to integrate their vessel operational activities. Strategic 
alliances were set up in 1994 by APL, OOCL, MOL and Nedlloyd in the name 
of Global Alliance for the Europe-Far East route. The new Grand Alliance 
(with the entrance of OOCL and MISC) and the New World Alliance became 
operational in January 1998.10) 
Today, of the top-10 shipping companies, only Evergreen and Mediterranean 
Shipping Company (MSC) remained an independent operator. Marketing 
operations and internal organization, by contrast, are integrated to a much 
lesser degree.11) 
The United Alliance, involving Hanjin, DSR-Senator and Cho Yang was 
formed in October 1997; activities started in March 1998. There was the 
reorganization of the two most important alliances, i.e. the Grand Alliance and 
the Global Alliance, due to the creation of P&O Nedlloyd (January 1997) and 
the takeover of APL by NOL (April 1997).
M&A or alliance strategies offer unique benefits to managers seeking to 
create and sustain a competitive advantage for their companies. However, 
strategic alliances are likely to increase organizational complexity and 
competition among member companies and have its inherent problems with 
allocation of responsibilities and instability. This suggests that for firms 
suffering from these problems M&As could be a preferred growth path. 
2. M&As and Corporate governance 
1) Mergers & Acquisitions
In Mergers and Acquisitions the course of a merger deal can be affected by 
managers’ personal interests and incentives, not necessarily aligned with those 
10) Heaver, Meersman, Moglia and Van de Voorde (2000), pp.353-373.
11) Heaver, Meersman, Moglia and Van de Voorde (2000).
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This can result to a loss of future compensation and possible misalignment 
of incentives between the target’s board and shareholders. In some target 
companies, incumbents might attempt to avert ‘value enhancing’ mergers. 
In other cases, target executives may agree to lower merger premiums in 
exchange for offers of future employment or other perquisites with the 
successor company. 
while target managers risk losing their seats, manager incentives to promote a 
merger deal tend to diverge from those of their shareholders.12) Shareholders 
generally prefer their company to become a target, while managers prefer 
their company be one of the survivors. The attitude of the management 
structure towards shareholder interests. 
Bleeke and Ernst13) suggested that alliances are often precursors to 
acquisition and that wealth may be destroyed in the merger attempt. 
Harrigan14) and Levine and Byrne15) suggested that 60% of mergers fail to 
achieve their economic promise. The greater market share of lines realized 
through mergers and alliances may create some initial heightened market 
power, but this is unlikely to result in sustained high profit margins in the 
dynamically competitive international shipping and logistics industry.16) 
Sources of wealth destruction in mergers include the hubris hypothesis,17) 
agency problem and managerial entrenchment,18) bad judgment19) and the 
escalation of commitment.20) Jensen and Ruback,21) Halpern22) and Weston et 
al.23)
Managers may opportunistically use their control to pursue objectives which 
are contrary to the interest of shareholders. Hiller and Hambrick24) argue 
that executives with a strong evaluation are likely to make quick strategic 
12) Syriopoulos and Theotokas (2007), pp.225-242.
13) Bleeke and Ernst (1995), pp.97-106.
14) Harrigan (1988), pp.53-72.
15) Levine and Byrne (1986), pp.100-106.
16) Panayides and Gong (2002), pp.55-80.
17) Roll (1986), pp.197-216
18) Jensen, (1986), pp.323-329 ; Morck et al. (1988), pp.293-315.
19) Morck et al. (1990), pp.31-48.
20) Lys and Vincent (1995), pp.353-378.
21) Jensen and Ruback (1983).
22) Halpern (1983), pp.297-317.
23) Weston, J. F., Chung, K. S., Siu, J. A. (1998). 
24) Hiller and Hambrick (2005), pp.297-319.
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decisions with little analyses, engage in large-scale strategic actions (e.g. 
decision successfully.25) 
The management team which attaches the highest value to corporate assets 
or promises the highest returns to shareholders takes over the right to manage 
these assets until it is replaced by another management team that attributes 
even greater value to corporate assets. Competition between management 
teams in the market for corporate control increases the pressure on managers 
to perform well.
The assumption made by some agency theorists is that evidence of self-
serving managerial behaviors can be inferred by comparing the corporate 
diversification behaviors of firms with strong shareholder monitoring to 
those with little shareholder monitoring.26) Specifically, firms without large 
shareholders are expected to engage in more unrelated acquisitions and show 
27) 
2) Ownership structure
Firms may be owned by a diverse mix of different types of investors. These 
investors become owners in firms to accomplish financial objectives.28) 
Scholars have demonstrated that owners shape the incentives of managers 
to make competitive decisions. They suggest that owners may affect both 
vertical relationships (i.e. upstream suppliers and downstream buyers) and 
29) 
Research on the relationship between a firm’s ownership structure and 
corporate diversification has also received considerable attention. Financial 
economists often cite a study by Amihud and Lev30)  to show that the 
absence of large and powerful shareholders results in greater unrelated 
product diversification. However, the relationship between the ownership 
concentration and firm diversification researchers is not clear cut. Lane, 
Cannella Jr., and Lubatkin31), for example, found that ownership concentration 
25) Krishnan, Hitt and Park (2007), pp.709-732.
26) Lane, Cannella Jr. and Lubatkin (1998), pp.555-587.
27) Jensen and Meckling (1976), p.305 ; Eisenhardt (1989), pp.57-74.
28) Connelly, Hoskisson, Robert, Tihanyi and Certo (2010), in press.
29) Vroom and Gimeno (2007), pp.901-922.
30) Amihud and Lev (1981), pp.605-617.
31) Lane, Cannella Jr. and Lubatkin (1998), pp.555-587.
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was not related to product diversification. Ramaswamy, Li, and Veliyath32) 
found that pressure-sensitive owners are associated with unrelated product 
diversification whereas the association is negative for pressure-resistant 
33) but for different reasons. 34) 
3) Inside ownership
Firms with family ownership provide distinct examples of conflicts over 
shareholders and atomic shareholders. Family ownership can be advantageous 
because the family has the incentive and power to monitor managers, thereby 
minimizing the free-rider problem in firms with more widely dispersed 
ownership structure.35)
Equity ownership by insiders helps align the interests of managers and 
shareholders.36) These insiders are likely to make decisions consistent with 
interests of the broader constituency of shareholders. 
Sheifer and Vishny37) document that family shareholders are common 
and, note that founding families continue to hold large equity stakes and 
board seats. In many cases families are large shareholders and holding a top 
management position. This family ownership represents a unique class of 
and often control the management team. This implies that they are more 
willing to employ firm resources towards long-term profitability and less 
However, in family firms salient conflict occurs from family’s potential 
shareholders have concerns with moderating family influence and power. 
the question of whom or what keeps the family from expropriating minority 
shareholders’ wealth.38) Minority shareholders (investors) are protected when 
32) Ramaswamy, Li and Veliyath (2002), pp.345-358.
33) George, Wiklund and Zahra (2005), pp.210-233.
34) Tihanyi, Johnson, Hoskisson and Hitt (2003), pp.195-211.
35) Anderson and Reeb (2004), pp.209-239.
36) Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), pp.377-397 ; Perry and Zenner (2000), pp.123-152 ; Himmelberg et al. (1999), pp.353-384 ; 
      Dalton et al. (2003), pp.13-26.
37) Sheifer and Vishny (1986), pp.461-488.
38) Anderson and Reeb (2004), pp.209-239.
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they have power relative to controlling shareholders and are able to limit large 
At the same time, other scholars such as Morck et al.,39) insist potential 
pernicious effects of shareholder-managers. High level of ownership by 
insiders, participation of family in management, may provide executives with 
Once entrenched, managers may consume more perquisites and/or reduce 
managerial ownership may as often lead to goal misalignment with respect 
to such issues as backdating of stock options, earning manipulation, and 
dividend policies.40) 
Prior research indicates that several conventional corporate governance 
mechanisms used in mitigating agency conflicts between managers and 
groups. Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-Kintana, and Makri41) and Kole42) found that 
the takeover market, institutional investors, and incentive compensation are 
4) Outside ownership 
level outcomes. Institutional owners foster restructuring activity in order to 
43)
motivate large block ownership by outsiders: concentrated control and private 
benefits.44) Most of outside owners are institutional investors. Institutional 
investors are a broad array of entities, including mutual funds, hedge funds, 
insurance companies, university and charitable endowment funds, pension 
funds, investment banks, investment advisors, and portfolio managers, among 
many others. Their common trait is that they actively deploy the pooled 
39) Morck, R., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1988), pp. 293–315.
40) Bhattacharya (1981), pp.163-180 ; Devers et al. (2007), pp.1016-1072.
41) Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-Kintana and Makri (2003).
42) Kole (1997), pp.79-104.
43) Bethel and Liebeskind (1993), pp.15-31.
44) Connelly, Hoskisson, Tihanyi and Certo (2010).
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45) 
Institutional investors today hold or at least control the purchase/sale/
voting decision-making over most of the outstanding shares in most large 
public corporations, and certainly most of the shares that actively trade in the 
raiders are institutional investors. Institutional shareholders frequently hold 
more than a majority of the target’s shares, and so have a large say in the 
outcome of the acquisition or merger vote. Fewer institutional investors than 
individual shareholders have emotional ties to the company, and therefore 
are less likely to support management, therefore becoming the swing vote for 
both the bidder and the target. 
Different types of institutional owners may have different impacts on 
firm strategies, including internationalization,46) and performance.47) Some 
scholars48) differentiate between ‘pressure-resistant’ and ‘pressure-sensitive’ 
institutional investors and show their different effects on strategic decisions. 
influence on strategy choices.49) In contrast, pressure-sensitive investors, 
such as domestic financial institutions, likely have business relationships 
with investee firms and often have an obligation to support management’s 
agendas.50) 
III. Empirical study
In the empirical study I will examine the relationship between corporate 
of such corporate governance variables as ownership structure, board 
of directors, and composition of the board of directors to the choice of 
consolidation strategies. 
45) Porter (2009), pp.627-682.
46) Hoskisson et al. (2002), pp.697-716 ; Tihanyi et al. (2010).
47) Douma et al. (2006), pp.637-657.
48) e.g. David et al. (1998), pp.200-208.
49) Hoskisson et al. (2002), pp.697-716
50) Tihanyi et al. (2010), in press.
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1. Data collection
For empirical analysis, we investigate M&As and global alliances occurred 
during 2006-2007 fiscal years in maritime industry. Maritime industry 
comprises many sub-sectors such as inland water transportation, storage, 
building of vessels etc. We have narrowed the sample firms to the deep 
sea foreign transportation, excluding trucking, shipbuilding & repairing, 
cargo handling, and warehousing & storage firms to fine the analysis. Data 
necessary such as Ownership, dividend, board of directors are obtained from 
their world grand alliance announcement for the comparison analysis. 
Firm size is measured by the book value of total assets. CEO Dual is a 
dummy variable measuring whether the chairperson is holding the position 
of the CEO at the same time. If the chairperson is also the CEO of the 
members sitting on the board of directors. Bmeeting measures the number of 
board meetings held during the year. ACQUISITION refers to the number of 
Prindirs is the ratio of independent directors to the total number of board of 
director members. 
3. Descriptive statistics 
<Table 1> presents summary statistics of variables used in the study. Firm 
size ranges from 58 million USD to 62,739 million USD, with the mean value 
of 5,509 million USD. A multiple office-holding is widespread in shipping 
industry, because we find that 67% of chairperson is the CEO of the firm 
at the same time on average. With respect to the board size, firms have a 
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on the board of directors. The number of board meeting varies from four to 
nineteen times with an average of eight times a year. When they launch a 
the board of directors. 
 
<Table 1> Descriptive statistics 
Minimum Maximum Mean Median S.D.
Firm size, million USD 58 62739 5509.44 4621.00 10889.27
CEO dual, dummy 0 1 .67 1.0 .48
Bsize, nr. 5 14 9.67 9.0 2.39
Bmeeting, nr. 4 19 7.61 5.0 4.56
Acquisition, nr. 1 9 5.23 4.0 3.34
Pr Acquisition, % 78 100 90.94 100 11.15
Prindirs, % 0 1 .40 0.42 .22
To test the different characteristics of shipping firms in terms of 
consolidation strategies, I have classified the firms into two categories and 
activities, namely, M&As, and International alliances. <Table 2 > shows 
alliances. 
 
Mergers & Acquisitions International Alliances
Number of M&As Number of alliances
EITZEN MARIT 1 Maersk 1
CAMIL EITZEN 1 NOL 1
HARBOUR LINK 9 NYK 1
EITZEN CHEM 1 K-LINE 1
Clarksons 2 HMM 1
Costal Contracts 1 MOL 1
Seacor Holdings 1 OOCL 1
Global carriers 4 YML 1
EITZEN MARIT 1 HJS 1
EVERGREEN 1
MISC 1
Total cases 21 11
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of a primary outside blockholder with a very large stake (e.g. the state or a 
corporate ‘raider’). However, in most firms the presence of several smaller 
blockholders is more common than a single majority blockholder.51) To the 
extent their interests are aligned, blockholders may work together to enhance 
their concentrated control.
<Table 3> shows the distribution and identities of the three largest 
shareholders in the sample shipping firms. First, second, and third 
shareholders show the proportion held by the three largest shareholders. 
We find that institutional investors are present as the largest shareholder at 
ownership appears to be quite common in shipping industry. One-third of the 
or government as the first largest shareholder is minimal. With respect to 
the second large shareholder, the institutional investors are prevalent with 
The dominant identities of the third large shareholders are also institutional 
investors and family. Other shareholders such as Individual, Industry, 
Government and Employees are present as dominant owners in rare cases. 
Consequently, the ownership in shipping industry is very concentrated and the 
identity of shareholders is limited. 
<Table 3> Identities of the largest shareholders, % 
1st large shareholder 2nd large shareholder 3rd large shareholder
Institutional investor 53.6 67.7 44.8
Family 35.7 19.4 51.7
Individual 3.6 0.0 0.0
Industry 3.6 9.7 3.4
Government 3.6 0.0 0.0
Employees 0.0 3.2 0.0
As institutional investors and family are two major controlling shareholders, 
we have classified firms into two categories; firms controlled by outside 
owners (institutional investors) and inside owners (families). <Table 
4> presents the ownership concentration by outsider and insiders as the 
51) Maury and Pajuste (2005), pp.1813-1834.
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controlling shareholders, and the proportion possessed by the second and the 
how many stocks either institutional investors or families hold when they 
are the principal large shareholder of the firm. When the firm has a family 
as a dominant owner, they hold about 51% of the firm stock and 52% for 
institutional investors. In contrast, the proportions held by the second and 
the third large shareholders are 13% and 5% respectively. By the fact that the 
proportion held by the other two large shareholders is relatively small with 
respect to the dominant shareholder, we can assume that the power exercised 
by the largest shareholder is immense. 
of German listed companies, 65.8% of Italian listed companies, and 64.2% 
of Swedish listed companies have a blockholder at least 25% control level. 
Those shareholders are a single individual, family or group. Claessens, 
Djankov, and Lang find that a single shareholder has control in more than 
1st large
shareholder, %
2nd large
shareholder, %
3rd large
shareholder, %
Outside owner- 52.0 16.56 5.5
Inside owner- 50.65 10.74 4.72
The result suggests that the monitoring role exercised by controlling 
shareholders as a means to ameliorate agency problems in shipping firms 
shareholders and the non-controlling shareholders over the extraction of 
private benefits of control — benefits to the controlling shareholder not 
provided to the minority shareholders.52) 
regarding corporate governance. <Table 5> shows characteristics of firms 
which launched M&As or formed a global alliance and mean difference tests. 
Firms with M&A are different from those which engaged in an alliance. 
52) Gilson (2006), pp.1641-1679.
033
Impacts of the board of directors and ownership structure on 
consolidation strategies in shipping industry
 
Variables such as governance power, firm size, and proportion of outside 
directors on the board of directors are statistically significant. Governance 
power is measured by the amount of dividend distributed to the shareholders. 
The signaling function of dividends is important from a corporate governance 
perspective. Dividend cuts are often interpreted by the market as powerful 
signals of bad news about a company. As a result, the failure to meet an 
anticipated dividend level can prompt corrective action designed to avert 
a potential crisis.53) Dividend policy is the proxy of the power of board 
of directors (BODPOWER). Inside ownership represents the proportion 
held by the family members. Outside ownership is institutional investor’s 
shareholding. 
We find that larger firms have formed more alliances than M&As. The 
firms initiate more international alliances, it is supposed that consolidation 
movement of shipping industry is led by small firms. Firms with strong 
corporate governance are likely to engage more alliances than M&As process. 
With respect to the ownership concentration, the more the ownership is 
concentrated, the more controlling shareholders are likely to expand their 
Whether the CEO is also sitting on the position of chair is not related to 
the choice of either alliance or M&A strategy. The size of board of directors 
does not matter to the M&A or alliance strategy. In contrast, the number 
of meetings that the board of directors has is associated with an alliance 
strategy. Firms which engaged in the process of M&A appoint more outside 
directors on the board. It is found that the preference for M&A strategy or 
global alliance strategy diverges between controlling shareholder group 
(outsiders and insiders) and outside directors on the boards. This implies that 
the ownership structure is an alternative to governance techniques such as 
independent directors and takeovers.54) 
54) Gilson (2006), pp.1641-1679.
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<Table 5> difference of means tests 
Alliances Mergers & Acquisitions
t-testMean S.D. S.E. of mean Mean S.D. 
S.E. of 
mean
Firm size 8.9542 0.8429 0.2542 6.3999 2.0455 0.4361 5.060***
 Governance 
power 111.78 90.875 27.400 1.36 3.300 .703 4.029***
BoDpower 1.00 .000 .000 .36 .492 .105 6.062***
Outside 
ownership .40 .516 .163 .61 .502 .118 1.047
Inside 
ownership .40 .516 .163 .33 .485 .114 0.341
Bmeeting 10.43 5.192 1.962 6.67 4.041 .882 1.989*
Prindirs .31 .261 .079 .45 .179 .038 1.771*
CEO Dual .64 .505 .152 .68 .477 .102 0.253
Bsize 10.18 2.316 .698 9.41 2.443 .521 0.871
IV. Conclusion
While many M&As are proved to be failed in terms of financial 
the top management for the strategic decisions such as M&As and alliances. 
Most important strategic decisions are made in the board of directors’ room 
by the CEO, the president, and other board members. 
The paper investigates M&As and global alliances occurred during 2006-
2007 fiscal years in maritime industry with respect to internal corporate 
control mechanisms. In the empirical study, it is found that the shipping 
industry has a highly concentrated ownership structure. Institutional investors 
governance is an important factor to shape alliance and M&A strategies.
Shareholders can either directly monitor managers or use the board of 
directors mechanism. While the level of ownership held by either insiders or 
outsiders does not influence the alliance or M&As strategies, the variables 
such as governance power and BODPOWER are significant. This suggests 
that shareholders in shipping industry apply corporate governance mechanism 
to monitor managers rather than to monitor directly. 
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The corporate governance mechanism in shipping industry operates as a 
bonding mechanism that commits managers to maximize share values. A 
shipping company having a strict policy of making regular cash distributions 
to shareholders constrains executives to run the company well enough to 
generate sufficient net cash flow. Managers of these firms are less likely to 
pursue the concentration strategy especially the M&A attempt. Moreover, an 
ongoing commitment to pay dividends places inherent limits on the ability of 
 
* Date of Contribution ; Jan. 4, 2012
   Date of Acceptance ; March 30, 2012
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